Abstract. This paper presents MarkPledge3 (MP3), the most efficient specification of the MarkPledge (MP) technique. The MP technique allows the voter to verify that her vote is correctly encrypted with a soundness of 1 − 2 −α , with 20 ≤ α ≤ 30, just by performing a match of a small string (4-5 characters). Due to its simplicity, verifying the election public data (vote encryptions and tally) in MP3 is 2.6 times faster than with MP2 and the vote encryption creation on devices with low computational power, e.g. smart cards, is approximately 6 times better than the best of the previous MP specifications (MP1 and MP2).
Introduction
The MarkPldege (MP) technique was introduced by Neff in 2004 [22] with the goal of providing high vote encryption assurance to the voter, i.e. give the voter high certainty that the encrypted vote, generated by the voting machine, is an encryption of the voter's choice. In its essence MP defines how to encrypt two types of votes: a vote in favor of a candidate, a Y ESvote, and a vote against/neutral to a candidate, a N Ovote. The MP candidate vote encryption is special because it contains random data that is used to create a verification code, which can to prove to the voter the type of the candidate vote encryption. The voter verifies that a candidate vote encryption is in fact a Y ESvote by doing a short string match. The verification of a N Ovote usually requires some extra effort from the voter, but can be made unneeded by the specific vote protocol where it is used.
In MP based vote protocols [1, 3, 4, 19, 22] , the voter's choice is encrypted with a Y ESvote, for the selected candidate, and with several independent N Ovotes for the non selected candidates. Then, a vote receipt is created with the verification codes of all candidate vote encryptions. To simplify the voter's receipt verification, the vote protocol provides a mathematical proof that there is only one Y ESvote in the set of candidate encryptions, therefore the voter only needs to verify the Y ESvote candidate encryption.
The soundness of the voter verification process is 1 − 2 −α , where α is a configurable security parameter that defines the size in bits of the verification code to match. To achieve a usability vs security balance, α is usually set to a value between 20 and 30, corresponding to a verification code of 4 to 5 characters.
The high soundness of the voter's receipt verification is only guaranteed if the vote encryption is valid and the vote receipt correct, i.e. if there is only one Y ESvote and if all verification codes match the corresponding individual candidate vote encryptions. However, the proofs of vote validity and receipt correctness require some complex math, which the common voter cannot perform. Thus, the MP technique, and the vote protocols that use it, define public verifiable vote validity and receipt correctness proofs to protect the voter's privacy. Anyone with the sufficient knowledge and computational power can verify the validity and correctness of all vote-receipt pairs.
Our major contribution is a faster MP solution (MP3) that can be proven to be as sound and privacy-keeping as any of previous MP solutions [4, 22] , without consuming more memory. Both previous MP solutions [4, 22] have high computational vote generation costs, which makes them unsuitable to be used in mobile voting scenarios where the voting machine has low computational power, e.g. a smart-card or a secure element of a mobile phone, both usually standard JavaCards. MP3 also offers a considerable 2.6 times improvement on the public vote-receipt validity and correctness verifications over the best previous solution (MP2). This improvement enlarges the number of public organizations with enough computer power to verify all the votes of a national general election .
Our second contribution is an abstraction layer for the MP technique, composed of 5 functions: the vote encryption function VE pk , which creates the candidate vote encryption; the vote receipt creation function RC pk , which given a candidate encryption generates the corresponding verification code; the vote validity function VV pk , which verifies the validity of a candidate encryption; the receipt validity function RV pk , which validates the correspondence between a candidate vote encryption and a verification code; and, finally, a canonicalization function C pk which prepares the candidate vote encryption for the vote tally process. The MP abstraction layer adds nothing to the MP solutions (MP1, MP2 and MP3) or to the MP based vote protocols. It only identifies common processes to all MP solutions, thus, it facilitates the comparison of the different MP solutions and their substitution in a MP based vote protocol.
We have partially implemented each one of the three MP solutions (MP1, MP2 and MP3) in two types of smart-cards, a MULTOS smart card and a JavaCard. The former is faster, but the latter is more ubiquitous, being deployed in secure elements of recent mobile phones and many National Identity Cards. In both cases MP3 is the only viable solution given that the time required to vote with MP1 and MP2 exceeds the time a user will be, usually, willing to wait.
The next section presents the related work and describes the simplified version of a MP vote protocol. Sections 3 and 4 describe the new MP3 proposal and present a detailed description of its cryptographic functions. Section 5 provide a comparative analysis of all MP solutions. Finally, we conclude in section 6.
